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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

I. INTRODUCTION
The principle of legal autonomy in American higher education
dates back at least to the famed Dartmouth College case in 1819,1
in which the United States Supreme Court held that any action by
the New Hampshire Legislature inconsistent with the College charter
granted by the British crown in 1769 would be an impairment of the
obligation of contract in violation of article I, section 10 of the United
States Consitution.
It was in this tradition, amplified by their own dissatisfaction
with a politically controlled educational system, that the people of
North Dakota approved an amendment to article 54 of their state
constitution in 1938, establishing a State Board of Higher Education
with "full authority" over several state institutions assigned to its
"control and administration." An observer of the North Dakota scene
some forty years later would find very little judicial clarification of
the degree of autonomy granted by this charter.
There have been several notable conflicts and recent court decisions in states geographically close to North Dakota, however, regarding the relative authority of the legislatures or executive agencies and the constitutionally established governing boards of higher
education in those states. These decisions define several major principles of governing board automony which will be applied in an
evaluation of certain measures approved by the 1977 session of the
North Dakota Legislature regarding the State Board of Higher Education and the institutions under its jurisdiction.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY OF THE NORTH DAKOTA
STATE BOARD OF HIGHER EDUCATION
A.

ADOPTION OF ARTICLE

54

The establishment of the North Dakota State Board of Higher
Education was a result of the state's first fifty years of experience
in operating a state-wide system of public schools and colleges.
The particular form given to the Board as a constitutionally autonomous body grew out of the highly charged political atmosphere
brought about in the state during its fourth and fifth decades by the
activities of William "Wild Bill" Langer and the Nonpartisan League.
The constitution approved by the people of North Dakota upon
attaining statehood in 1889 directed the first session of the state
legislature to provide for a "uniform system of free public schools
. . . up to and including the normal and collegiate course."' 2 The
Legal Advisor, North Dakota State University; B.A., University of North Dakota,
1966; J.D., Stanford University, 1969.
1. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 518 (1819).
2. N.D. CO.NST. § 148 ('18S9, amended 196S
The legislative discretion to establish
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1889 constitution also gave the legislature the responsibility of providing for the maintenance of such schools 3 and of taking other
appropriate steps for the educational benefit of the State's citizens. 4
Finally, the constitution expressly stated that, "All colleges, universities, and other educational institutions . . . shall remain under the
absolute control of the state." 5
The legislature exercised these constitutional responsibilities by
establishing a State Board of Education for the control of high
schools,' several boards of trustees (one for the state normal schools
and one for each of the other institutions of higher education) ,
and, later, a single Board of Regents for all of the higher education
institutions."
This system of legislative control of public education endured for
some thirty years until its demise following the 1918 general election.
When N. C. MacDonald, the Nonpartisan League candidate for Superintendent of Public Instruction was defeated in that election by a
woman educator named Minnie Nielson, Governor Lynn Frazier (also
a member of the NPL and a close political associate of MacDonald)
retaliated. 9 He persuaded the 1919 session of the legislature to
assign the functions of the State Board of Education and the Board of
Regents to a new Board of Administration, with responsibility for all
penal, welfare and educational institutions in the state. 10 While the
Superintendent of Public Instruction was given a seat on the board,
along with the Commissioner of Agriculture, control of the board was
held by three members appointed by the Governor.
This transfer of educational responsibility for the state's educational system from the legislative to the executive branch was made
complete when the Board of Administration proceeded to name N. C.
MacDonald as its executive director, thus making Minnie Nielson,
who had defeated him for the superintendent's office, effectively subordinate to him."
These developments set the stage for an even greater political
such

schools was somewhat restricted,

required

however, by other sections of the constitution

the location of certain state schools and institutions at particular cities In

that

the

state. Id. §§ 215-216.
3. Id. § 147.
4. Id. § 151.
5. Id. § 152.
6. 1913 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 149 (repealed 1919).
7. 1891 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 89 (repealed 1915) (normal schools); 1890 N.D. Sess.
Laws ch. 158 (repealed 1915) (science school); 1890 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 160 (repealed
1915) (agricultural college) ; 1883 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 40 (repealed 1915) (university).
While the boards thus created were given different names, e.g., "board of equcation,"
"board of directors" and "board
of trustees,"
they all were referred to as board of
trustees in the state's next codification of laws. 1895 N.D. REV. CODES §§ 876, 907, 924.
935.
8. 1915 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 237 (repealed 1919).
9.

10.
11.

A.

GEFLAN,

THE DAKOTA

MAVERICK

40 (1975).

1919 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 71 (repealed
A. GEEI.AN', supra note 9, at 41.

1939).
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conflict that was to lead to the establishment of the State Board of
of Higher Education and hopefully a more secure system of education
in North Dakota. In 1937 "Wild Bill" Langer was the Governor and
three of the five Board of Administration members were his appointees. That year the Board instituted what was to be called "The
A. C. Purge" by firing seven faculty and staff members at the
North Dakota Agricultural College, including the state county agent
leader. The Board also relieved the Director of the Experiment Station and Extension Service from his duties and accepted the resignation of the College president. The stated reasons for the actions
were "economy and efficiency," but many people believed they were
intended to give Langer control of Experiment Station and Extension
Service funds and appointments, including the ability to allocate
about $20,000,000 per year in benefit payments to farmers under the
Agricultural Adjustment Act and to use farm and home demonstra2
tion agents for political purposes.1
Public protest of the Board's actions increased following the decision in April 1938 of the North Central Association of Colleges and
Secondary Schools to remove the N.D.A.C. from its list of accredited
schools, on the grounds that there had been, "undue interference"
by the Board in the internal administration of the college, that faculty morale had declined to the point that the quality of instruction
was "seriously jeopardized," and that the legal structure and organization of the Board of Administration provided no assurance of a
"stable and constructive leadership" or of a "sufficient degree of
autonomy" for the N.D.A.C. and the other institutions of higher edu13
cation in the State.
Public dissatisfaction with the Board's role in bringing about
this disaster found an obvious outlet in the form of support for
an initiated measure placed on the June 1938 primary election
ballot. The measure called for the transfer of control over higher
education institutions in North Dakota from the Board of Administration to a constitutionally independent State Board of Higher Education. Following its approval by a vote of 93,156 to 71,448, the measure
was adopted as article 54 of the Amendments to the North Dakota
4
Constitution.
B. PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 54

Both the membership of the State Board of Higher Education
and its powers as defined in article 54 were designed to assure freedom from the kind of political interference that had characterized
12. Id. at 84 : L. GEiG,,R UNIVERSITy OF THE .N'ORTHERN PfIN.-\ S 396 (1958)
BEACON ACRosS THE PRAIRIES 146 (1961).
13. W. HUNTER, supra note 12, at 153-54.
14.
1939 N.D. Sess. Laws, p. 499 (approved June 28, 1938).

; NV. HUNTFE,
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the Board of Administration. 15 Although the Governor was given the
power under article 54 to appoint the seven members of the new
Board, his discretion in filling any open position was limited to
choosing from a list of three nominees unanimously selected by the
President of the North Dakota Education Association, the Chief
Justice of the State Supreme Court, and the Superintendent of Public
Instruction, and his appointment was subject to confirmation by the
Senate.16 Furthermore, the Governor's ability to influence Board
members after their appointment was limited by provisions that
they serve seven-year terms (compared to the two-year term then
in effect for the Governor)' 7 and that they could be removed only
18
by impeachment.
The autonomy and independence of the new Board was further
assured by several broad grants of authority in article 54:
1. A board of higher education, to be officially known as the
State Board of Higher Education, is hereby created for the control and administration of the following state educational institutions .... 19
6(b). The said State Board of Higher Education shall have full
authority over the institutions under its control with the right,
among its other powers, to prescribe, limit, or modify the courses
offered at the several institutions . . . . [and] shall have full
authority to organize or re-organize within constitutional and statuory limitations, the work of each institution under its control,
and do each and everything necessary and proper for the efficient and economic administration of said State educational institutions.
(e). The said State Board of Higher Education shall have the
control of the expenditure of the funds belonging to, and allocated
15. Within a month of its organization in 1939, the board unanimously approved a
resolution declaring the following: "It
will be the plea and purpose of the state board
of higher e Thcation to clearly and definitely divorce the institutions of higher learning
from so called 'political' domination or interference." W. HUNTER, supra note 12, at 161.
16. N.D. OONST.
art. 54, § 2(a).
17. N.D. CONST. art. 71. The Governor's term of office has subsequently been changed
to four years. 1965 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 475 (approved June 30, 1964).
18. N.D. CoNsT'. art. 54, §§ 2(a), 3.
19. The list of institutions, as amended by N.D. CONST. art. 90, now reads as follows:
(1)
The State University and School of Mines, at Grand Forks, with
their substations.
(2)
The State Agricultural College and Experiment Station, at Fargo,
with their substations.
(3)
The School of Scionce, at Wahreton.
(4)
The Stato Normal Schools and Teachers Colleges, at Valley City,
MIayville, Minot, an'! Dickinson.
(5)
The School of Forestry, at Bottineau.
(6)
And such other state institutions of higher education as may hereafter be established.
1971 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 623, § 2 : 1973 N.D. Sess. Laws eh. 526.
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to such institutions and also those appropriatedby the legislature,
for the institutions of higher education in this State .... 20
The only allowance in article 54 for legislative involvement in
the affairs of the institutions under the Board's jurisdiction appears
to be the language in Section 6 (b) granting to the Board the authority
to organize or re-organize the work of such institutions "within constitutional and statutory limitations." The right of the legislature to
become involved in the state system of higher education thus appears
to be limited to its already-existing authority to approve statutes.
Other provisions of the North Dakota Constitution grant this authority
in general terms by vesting the "legislative power of the state" in
the legislature, 21 by directing the legislature to "pass all laws necessary to carry into effect the provisions of this constitution, " 22 and by
providing that each house of the legislature "shall have all other
powers necessary and usual in the legislative assembly of a free
23
state."
The state constitution is more specific regarding the legislature's
authority over financial matters. Section 148, for example, which
directs the legislature to "provide for a uniform system of free public schools throughout the state," was amended in 1968 to allow the
legislature to "authorize tuition, fees, and service charges to assist
'24
in the financing of public schools of higher education.
'Another specific grant of legislative authority over higher education funds was provided in the following language of a 1970 amendment to section 153 of the constitution:
All property, real or personal, received by the state from whatever source, for any specific educational or charitable institution, unless otherwise designated by the donor, shall be and remain a perpetual trust fund for the creation and maintenance of
20. N.D. CONST. art. 54,
§§ 1, 6(h),(e) (emphasis added). Article 54 also includes the
following provisions regarding the authhori ty of the board :
6(a) . . . As soon as said board is established and organized, it shall
assume all the powers and perform all the duties now conferred by law
upon the board of Administration in connection with the several Institutions
hereinbefore mentioned ...
(d)
It shall be the duty of the heads of the several State institutions
hereinbefore mentioned, to submit the budget roqne ts for the biennial appropriations for said institutions to said State Boa,'d of H!iTber Education;
and said State, Board of lioher Education 'ball consider said budgets and
shall revise the same as in its judgment shall be for the best interests of
the (dentional system of the State: and thereafter the State Board of
Hi-,er
Educat;on shall prepare and present to the State Buidget Board and
to tho lerislatuire a single unified budget covering the needs of all the institutions under its control.
N.D. CONST. art. 54.
21.

N.D.

22.
2.1.
24.

Id.
Id.
Id.

CONST.

§

25.

§ 68.
§ 48.
148 (amended 1966).
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such institution, and may be commingled only with similar funds
for the same institution. Should a gift be made to an in'stitution for
a specific purpose, without designating a trustee, such gift may be
placed in the institution's fund; provided that such a donation
donation may be expanded as the terms of the gift provide.
The interest and income of each institutional trust fund held by
the state shall, unless otherwise specified by the donor, be appropriated by the legislative assembly to the exclusive use of the
25
institution for which the funds were given.
It thus appears that donors of property to the institutions under
the State Board of Higher Education may designate the manner in
which the property is to be used as well as the allocation of any
interest or income therefrom. In the absence of any such donor restrictions, however, the property is considered to be an institutional
trust fund, with the legislature responsible for appropriating any resulting interest or income for the exclusive use of the recipient institution.
Section 186 gives the legislature additional authority to control
the allocation of public moneys through its appropriation power:
All public moneys, from whatever source derived, shall be paid
over monthly by the public official, employee, agent, director,
manager, board, bureau, or institution of the State receiving the
same, to the State Treasurer, and deposited by him to the
credit of the State, and shall be paid out and disbursed only
pursuant to appropriation first made by the Legislature. .. .2
Since this appropriation power extends to all "public moneys,"
the degree to which it effectively authorizes legislative control of
higher education expenditures depends on the definition of "public
moneys." It would obviously include all state general funds derived
from the state's exercise of its taxation powers, and it would seem
likely that it also includes the student tuition, fees, and service
charges that the legislature can authorize under section 148 of the
constitution. It is doubtful, on the other hand, that the reference to
"public moneys" in section 186 includes funds derived from institutional operations that are exclusively under the jurisdiction of the
State Board of Higher Education, such as income from institutional
activities and federal grants. With regard to these funds, the provisions of 186 have to be reconciled with the language of article
54, which assigns to the Board "[t]he control of the expenditure of
25.
26.

Id. § 153 (amended 1976)
Id. § 186(1).

(emphass added).
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the funds belonging to, and allocated to such institutions and also
those appropriated by the legislature, for the institutions of higher
27
education in this State. . . ." (emphasis added)
The emphasized language clearly implies the existence of two
kinds of funds under the board's control: those "belonging to" the
institutions and those "appropriated by the legislature." The North
Dakota Attorney General has indicated that there would thus "appear
to be considerable question under the North Dakota Constitution" as
to the effect of the legislature's appropriation to the board of funds
2
already "belonging to" the institution.
Another article 54 limitation on the section 186 appropriation
power requires that, "[t]he legislature shall provide funds for the
proper carrying out of the functions and duties of the State Board of
Higher Education. 2 9 The effect of this language is to prohibit the
appropriation power from being used to deny the Board the funds
necessary for its operations and those of the institutions under its
jurisdiction. In State ex rel. Walker v. Link, 30 the Supreme Court of
North Dakota described the effect of this mandate in article 54 as
follows: "Neither the legislature nor the people can, without a constitutional amendment, refuse to fund a constitutionally mandated
function." 31 Referring to the possibility of a legislative failure to
appropriate funds for a constitutional function, the court indicated
that the necessary appropriation could be considered to be made by
2
the constitution, as a self-executing provision.
C. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE

54

The Walker case is one of just four North Dakota Supreme
Court decisions involving article 54 which provide an interesting
background for an analysis of the constitutional autonomy of the
State Board of Higher Education, although none of them deal directly
with that issue.
In the first of these cases, Posin v. State Board of Higher Education,33 the court was asked to review the action of the State Board
27. N.D. CONST. art. 54, § 6(e).
28. Letter from Allen 1. Olson to Robert Peterson (Jan. 6, 1977), citing Regents of
Univ. of Mich. v. State, 47 Mich. App. 23, 208 N.WY.2d 871 (1973); Bd. of Regents of
Higher Educ. v. Judge, 168 Mont. 433, 543 P.2d 1323 (1975) ; State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 86 N.M. 359, 524 P.2d 975 (1974).
29. N.D. CONST. art. 54, § 5.
30. 232 N.N,.2d 823 (N.D. 1975).
31. State ex rel. Walker v. Link, 232 N.AV.2d 823, 826 (N.D. 1975). In addition, the
institutions of higher education assigned to the board's jurisdiction by article 54 and thu
described by the tolker court as "constitutionally mandated" are also listed in sections
215 and 216 of the constitution as "public institutions of the state" to be "permanently
located" at specified locations. The lOlker opinion makes no mention, however, of these
alternative grants of constitutional stati's.
.12. Id., ritiog Ford Motor Co. v*.B:iker: 71 N.D. 298, 300 N.W. 435 (1941)
Langer v.
State. 69 N.D. 129, 284 N.W. 23, (1939) : State v, Baker, 65 N.D. 190, 262 NW. 183
(1934) : Stnte v. Hall, 44 N.D. 459, 171 N.V.211 (1919).
-12. 86 N.WV.20 .31 (N.D. 1957).
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of Higher Education in discharging four faculty members of the
North Dakota Agricultural College. The plaintiff faculty members
argued that the board had failed to comply with certain provisions
of the college constitution regarding discharge of employees. The
court ruled that the college constitution, even though it may be considered a rule or regulation approved by the Board, does not and
cannot, have the effect of diminishing, limiting, restricting, or qualifying the power and authority vested in the Board by article 54 and
certain state statutes which provided the following:
The state board of higher education shall have all the powers
and perform all the duties necessary to the control and management of the institutions described in this chapter, including the
following:
1. To elect and remove the president or other faculty head,
and the professors, instructors, teachers, officers and other employees of the several institutions under its control. .... 34
The court held that this reference to the power and authority of
the Board to "elect and remove" is a legislative designation of one
of its specific powers and is included in the "full authority" granted
to it by the North Dakota Constitution.
Nord v. Guy"5 involved a challenge to the constitutionality of a
legislative act which provided for the issuance by the state of
bonds and appropriated the proceeds of the bonds to the State Board
of Higher Education "for use in the construction and equipping of
facilities . .. at state institutions of higher education as determined
by the Board and in accordance with such schedule of priorities as
may be prescribed by such Board." 8
The plaintiff's argument was that this language provided for an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to the Board, and
this raised the question as to whether the Board's own constitutional
authority under article 54 was broad enough to include the functions
described in the act. The court then interpreted the Board's article
54 grant of power for the "control and administration" of the educational institutions to mean in general terms "the management and
supervision thereof." 3 7 The court held that this authority was not the
34. N.D. REV. CODE § 15-1017 (1943)
(current version at N.D. CENT. CODE § 15-10-17
(1971)).
35. 141 N.W.2d 395 (N.D. 1966).
36. 1965 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 155, § 19.
37. Prior to reaching this conclusion, the court reviewed dictionary definitions of "control" and "administration" as follows:
The word "control" is defined as a "power of authority to manage, direct,
superintend, restrict, regulate, govern, administer, Or oversee." See Black's
Law Dictionary, Third Edition. Webster's Third New International Dictionary Unabridged defines the word "control" as to "exercise restraining

.538
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kind of legislative power that the act attempted to delegate by
authorizing the Board to provide facilities at various ,state educational
institutions without specifying the institutions where such facilities
were to be constructed or the priority and cost of the facilities. 8
Having thus interpreted article 54 to not grant legislative authority to the State Board of Higher Education, the court held that the
Higher Education Facilities Bond Act was unconstitutional because
it attempted to delegate legislative powers to the Board in violation
of Section 25 of the North Dakota Constitution, which vests the legislative power of the state in the legislature. Nord, therefore, deals
with the problem caused by a legislative attempt to delegate legislative authority to the State Board of Higher Education, rather than a
legislative attempt to interfere with the management authority of such
a board, which is the focus of this article.
Zimmerman v. Minot State College"9 involved a claim by a college instructor that she had not been given twelve month notice of
the termination of her appointment, as provided by the tenure policy
that had been adopted by the State Board of Higher Education. The
Board defended the case in part by arguing that the plaintiff had
been given sufficient notice of termination under the provisions of
section 15-47-27 of the North Dakota Century Code, which provided
the following:
Any teacher who has been employed by . . . (the) state board

of higher education in this state during any school year, shall
be notified in writing by the . . . board not later than the fif-

teenth day of April in the school year in which he or she has
been employed to teach, of the board's determination not to
renew the teacher's contract for the ensuing school year....
The court responded by first determining that the board's policy
statement on tenure had been promulgated pursuant to its duties of
management and supervision granted by article 54 and section 1510-17(1) of the North Dakota Century Code. Rather than identifying
any constitutional issue, however, the court simply handled the case
as one involving a statutory conflict between sections 15-10-17(1)
or directing influence over: regulate, dominate, rule: have power over" and
"power

or authority

to guide or manage:

directing

or

restraining domina-

tion." The word "administration" is defined as "performance of executive
duties: management, direction, superintendence." See Webster's Third New
International Dictionary Unabridged.
Nord v. Guy, 141 N.W.2d 395, 402 (N.D. 1966).
38.. The court also held that the mandate in article 54 that the board "shall assume
all the powers and perform all the duties now conferred by law upon the Board of Addid
ministration in connection with the several institutions hereinbefore mentioned .

not vest the State Board of Higher Education with any legislative powers. Id.
39.

198 N.W.2d 108 (N.D. 1972).
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and 15-47-27. In resolving the conflict, the court applied the rule of
statutory construction favoring more specific provisions over general
provisions 4 0 and held that the authorization in section 15-10-17(1)
for the Board to promulgate rules was more specific to the situation
than the general notice provisions in sections 15-47-27. Therefore,
the case does not stand for the proposition that a policy of the Board
adopted pursuant to its constitutional authority prevails over a legislative directive involving the same matter, although the result in the
case is consistent with that principle.
Finally, in State ex rel. Walker v. Link4 1 the North Dakota Supreme Court was asked to review the action of the state's Emergency Commission in authorizing withdrawal of funds directly from
the state treasury for the operation of the University of North Dakota
after the legislature's biennial appropriation to the university was
apparently "suspended" under section 25 of the state constitution by
the filing of a referendum petition.
The court found that the provisions of section 25 that would appear to "suspend" a legislative appropriation until the referendum
election were in conflict with the requirements in article 54, section
5 that "[t]he legislature shall provide adequate funds for the proper
carrying out of the functions and duties of the state board of higher
education."
The court then held that such a conflict had to be resolved by
finding the more specific and more recent provisions of article 54
to be controlling. Again, it is important to note the lack of any conflict between the Board and the legislature; the case simply holds that
the legislature's appropriation of funds, in accordance with article
54, to institutions under the Board's jurisdiction may not be suspended
by the referendum process provided in the state constitution.
III. RECENT AUTONOMY CASES IN OTHER STATES
The fact that none of these North Dakota Supreme Court decisions
deals directly with the issue of the State Board of Higher Education's
autonomy vis-a-vis the legislature leaves an interesting void in the
interpretation of article 54.
The autonomy issue has arisen or been litigated recently in
several neighboring states with constitutional provisions similar to
article 54. Because of their direct relevance to the North Dakota
situation, these developments in Nebraska, Minnesota, South Dakota,
Montana, and Michigan should be examined closely.
40.
41.

N.D. CENT. CODE § 1-02-07 (1975).
232 N.W.2d 823 (N.D. 1975).

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

A. NEBRASKA

In July of 1977 the Supreme Court of Nebraska, in Board of
Regents of University of Nebraska v. Exon 42 decided a declaratory
judgment action that had been brought by the Regents against the
Governor (Exon), the State Director of Administrative Services, and
the State Director of Personnel. The purpose of the litigation was
to determine the validity of several actions of the Nebraska Legislature under Article VII, section 10 of the Nebraska constitution,
which states as follows: "The general government of the University
of Nebraska shall, under the direction of the legislature, be vested
in . . . the Board of Regents. .
prescribed by law. ..."

.

.Their duties and powers shall be

Both the state district court which first heard the case and the
state supreme !ourt on appeal ruled that the phrase "under the
direction of the iegislature" did not give the legislature the power
to direct the "government" of the university, but only the manner
in which it shall "be vested" in the Board of Regents. The result,
according to the supreme court, was that, "[i]t is the duty of the
legislature to implement the constitutional provision by[ enacting
legislation which vests the general government of the University in
the Board of Regents."

43

With regard to the constitutional language

requiring that the Regents' "duties and powers shall be prescribed
by law," the court ruled that the legislature could set forth the
powers and duties of the Regents, but only in a manner consistent
with the Regents' control over the general government of the university. The court stated the following:
[A]Ithough the legislature may add to or subtract from
the powers and duties of the Regents, the general government
of the University must remain vested in the Board of Regents
and powers or duties that should remain in the Regents cannot
be delegated to other officers or agencies. ...
. . .In prescribing the powers and duties of the Regents a legislative act must not be so detailed and specific in nature as to
eliminate all discretion and authority on the part of the Regents
as to how a duty shall be performed.The court then applied these principles in determining the validity of each of the following challenged legislative actions:
First, provisions in the 1975 and 1976 appropriations bills adopted
42. 199 Neb. 146, 256 N.WV.2d 330 (1977).
43. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Neb. v.
332-33 (1977).
44. Id. at , 256 N V.-d at .233.

Exon,

199 Neb.

146, -

, 256

N.%'V.2d

330,
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by the legislature directing the Board of Regents or employees of
45
the university to take certain actions. The trial court had held that
the legislature did not have the authority to do this, so that the
statements would have to be construed as only advisory in nature.
Although this question was not appealed, the Nebraska Supreme
Court indicated that it agreed with the trial court, stating that, "The
legislature can not use an appropriation bill to usurp the powers or
duties of the Board of Regents and to give directions to the emof the University
ployees of the University. The general government
46
must remain vested in the Board of Regents.
Second, a standing provision that money accruing to the university cash fund, which consists of money derived from the operation
of the university (such as student fees, sales of commodities raised
by the university, and medical center fees) shall become available
"when appropriated by the legislature. ' 4 7 In affirming the trial
court's holding that an annual appropriation by the legislature was
not required, the court cited a previous decision in which it had held
that a legislative appropriation was not required in order for the
Board of Regents to expend funds donated to the University by the
federal government. 48 The court reasoned that university funds which
are not derived from state taxes have a different status than the
general fund monies, since such funds are equivalent to trust funds
which can only be expended by the Board of Regents for the benefit
of the university, rather than being available to the legislature for
general governmental purposes. As an example of legislative recognition of the Board of Regents' control over such funds, the court
cited a longstanding state law which declared that, "[aill money accruing to the university funds is hereby appropriated to the use of
the state university. ' 49 It is significant that the court did not rely
upon this statute as evidence that the institutional income had already
been appropriated by the legislature, but instead used it to indicate
the unique status of the university's non-appropriated funds.
Third, provisions in the 1975 appropriation bill adopted by the
legislature requiring the approval of the Governor (in the case of
personal property) or the Governor and the legislature (in the case
of real property) before acceptance of any gift, bequest or devise
of property in excess of $10,000 to the state, including the university. 0 The court held that these provisions unlawfully delegated the
constitutional authority vested in the Board of Regents.
45. 1976 Neb. Laws 690, 972.
, 256 N.W.2d at 333.
46. 199 Neb. at 47. NEB. REV. STAT. § 85-125 (1976).
48. State ex rel. Spencer Lens Co. v. Searle, 77 Neb. 155, 108 N.W. 1119, 109 N.W.
770 (1906).
49. NEB. REV. STAT. § 85-131 (1976.
50. 1976 Neb. Laws 603, 605.
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Fourth, provisions fixing and determining the manner in which
raises are to be given to employees of the Board. The trial court
had held that the legislature had the authority to determine such
raises, but the supreme court overruled that finding and held that,
"[t]he determination of salary schedules and the compensation to be
paid to the employees of the Board of Regents is an integral part of
the general government of the University." 51 On a closely related
issue, the supreme court held that the State Director of Personnel
had no authority over university employees who had not been placed
under the state personnel system by the Board of Regents.
Fifth, provisions prescribing certain requirements concerning
planning, design, and construction of new facilities and the modification or repair of existing facilities.52 The supreme court held that
these laws could not apply to the Board of Regents or the university
because they would result in an unlawful delegation of the regents'
constitutional authority.
Sixth, provisions making the University subject to the Central
Data Processing division of the State Department of Administrative
Services.5 3 These were also found to be invalid by the supreme court
as an unlawful delegation of authority.
Seventh, provisions making the university subject to a centralized
purchasing and disposal program for property used by the state and
its agencies. 54 The supreme court held that these provisions would
unlawfully delegate the board's authority if held applicable to the
university.
Following the Exon decision, the Board of Regents at its September, 1977, meeting adopted a general policy of continuing existing
relationships with state agencies until recommendations for change
were proposed to the Board. Within a week of this action, the university administration established a task force composed of nine key
administrators who were charged with "the responsibility of listing
all of the issues and procedures which may cause some concern" in
light of the court decision.' 5
The task force issued its final report and recommendations in
December,' 6 including an outline analysis of 199 areas of university
policy or procedure that might be affected by the Exon decision.57
51. 199 Neb. at -,
256 N.WV.2d at 335.
52. NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-110.41-43 (Supp. 1977).
53. Id. § 81-1117 (Supp. 1977).
54. Id. § 81-153 to 162 (Supp. 1977).
55. Letter from William F. Swanson, Vice Pres., Univ. of Neb., to task force members
(Sept. 15, 1977)..
56. University Task Force on Response to the July, 1977 Nebraska Supreme Court Ruling
on Uni\'erslty Governance, Final Report and Recommendations (1977).
-7. Id. Attachment IV.

CONSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY

In addition, the report identified nineteen critical areas of concern. 58
Finally, the task force made the following recommendations:
That a specific timetable for development of policies
and procedures for an adequate personnel system be developed by the University's administrative staff as quickly as
possible.
That each of the nineteen critical areas of concern referred to above be assigned to a university office or staff
team for design of timetables and approaches to be used in
development of appropriate policies, procedures, and state
agency interfaces and relationships, required to bring the university into compliance with the Exon ruling.
That ongoing cooperation with other state agencies be
maintained by the assignment of specific liaison responsibilties to university administrators.
That administrative responsibility should also be assigned for improved development and management of administrative policies.
That ongoing legislative support be achieved by assigning the responsibility for informing legislators of the impact of any bills introduced in response to the action of the
Nebraska Supreme Court. 59

These activities and conclusions of the task force are important
because they underscore the significance and impact of the Exon
decision. Along with a guarantee of freedom from legislative interference in university governance, it implies a broad scope of responsibility that the Board of Regents must be willing to assume for managing the institution, not the least of which is the continued maintenance of a good relationship with various state agencies that used
to be more involved in supervising university affairs and could still
have a significant effect on its well-being. The task force emphasized the effect of the decision in both principle and practice by
stating that it recognized the Exon ruling
as not only a one-time incident of mere operational significance to the university, but also as a major guidepost of the
58. Id,
Exhibits A & B. The nineteen areas were: (1)
gifts, (2)
personnel, (3)
new
facilities, (4)
data processing, (5)
purchasing, (6)
ceilings controls, (7)
financial transaction processing, (8)
budget requests, (9)
grants and contracts, (10)
purchasing, (11)
capital construction, (12)
statewide coordination of higher education, (13)
authority of
collegiate faculties, (14)
legislative approval for new colleges, (15)
Department of Education approval of courses for VA certification,
(16)
state agency review of nonstate
grant proposals, (17)
clarification of ag-related Nebraska statutes to conform to contemporary expectations, names, titles, activities, etc., in IANR and other agriculture
agencies and bodies, (18)
academic staff-accountability to state agencies for activities,
external income, etc., and (19) professional certification. Id.
59. Id. at 1-3.
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State of Nebraska, reflecting its public policy for the relationship between state government and higher education
through the twentieth century. As such, the task force offers
the solemn admonition that the university and each of its
employees build upon this increased clarity in public policy
to improve cooperation between the university and other
state agencies, and to improve the operational. effectiveness
of the university, in ways and amounts that may have been
more difficult to establish before this clarification was! available.60
It is, of course, too early to tell whether or not the principle
of autonomy will actually survive as Nebraska's "public policy for
the relationship between state government and higher education
through the twentieth century." Any thought that the Board of Regents would no longer have to worry about legislative involvement
in educational policy-making must have been dispelled by the action
of the 1978 session of the Nebraska Legislature in approving two
comprehensive measures regarding postsecondary education 6 1 both
over Governor Exon's veto. One of these acts provided.for a "uniform information system for all public post-secondary education systems and institutions" in the state.6 2 Several broad purposes were
stated in the act, including the provision of "timely and accurate
information concerning the programs, personnel, students, finances,
and facilities" of the educational systems and institutions, and the
establishment of "an information base to support !state level planning, budgeting, and performance evaluation activities for postsecondary education." 63
The legislature's intent to be involved in education policy-making
was even more directly stated in a second measure approved during
the 1978 session.6 4 That act established "statements of role and
mission" for the state's postsecondary education systems and institutions in order to provide for a "coordinated state system," and to
"limit unnecessary program and facility duplication through coordinated planning." ' 65 The act also established a legislative review process to ensure that the institutions complied with the role and mission
statements and that the statements would be updated when necessary. 66 Further enforcement was provided for in a section of the act
which prohibits the expenditure of "funds generated or received
from a general fund appropriation, state aid assistance program,
60. Id. at 2.
61. See generally Jacobson, Takeover in Nebraska, THE CHRONICLE OF HIGHER EDUC.
at 3 (Apr. 10, 1978).
62. Neb. Leg. Bill 897 (1978).
63. Id. § 1.
64. NTeb. Leg. Bill 756 § (1978).
65. Id. § 1(2)(4) (1978).
66. Id. § 1(6),
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or receipts from a mill levy authorized by statute . . . in support
which are in conflict with the role and
of programs or activities
6 7
"
mission assignments.
In language that 'appears to be both self-contradictory and inconsistent with the Exon ruling, the act declares that, "[t]he legislature acknowledges the provisions of sections 10 and 13 of article VII
of the Nebraska Constitution. The provisions of this act reflect the
philosophy of the State of Nebra'ska and shall be acknowledged as
such and implemented by the Board of Regents of the University of
Nebraska .. ."6s The Board of Regents is also directed to "adopt
and promulgate policies and procedures necessary to assure compliance" with the act and the role and mission assignments for the
University of Nebraska system and its campuses.6 9
These directives are indeed very difficult to square with the
principles of the Regents' constitutional autonomy enunciated in
Exon. Only time will tell whether the Nebraska Supreme Court"s
ruling will have any lasting effect or whether the fiscal power of the
legislature will give it effective control of even those educational
policy matters that have been determined to be legally within the
scope of the Regents' constitutional authority.
B. MINNESOTA

Within a month of the Nebraska decision, the Minnesota Supreme
Court held in Regents of University of Minnesota v. Lord70 that an
act of the state legislature requiring a state designer selection board
to select designers for university buildings did not unduly infringe
upon the authority over the "government" of the University of Minnesota that was vested in its Board of Regents by the state constitution.
The case grew out of a controversy that began when the 1974 session
of the Minnesota Legislature enacted a state designer selection board
act that was expressly made applicable to the University of Minnesota as well as to other state agencies and departments. 71 The act
established a citizen board appointed by the governor with the responsibility for selecting the primary designer for state building
projects with estimated costs exceeding $250,000 or planning projects
with estimated fees greater than $20,000.
During the same session of the Minnesota Legislature, $30,000
was appropriated to the Board of Regents for planning the first
phase of a learning resources center at the University's St. Paul
campus. 72 The university proceeded to select a primary designer
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.

Id. § 17.
Id. § 56.
Id. § 19.
257 N.W.2d 796 (1977).
-Minn.--,
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 16.821-27 (West 1977).
1974 Minn. Laws ch. 516.
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for the project without going through the state designer selection
board. When it requested payment from the state for the designer's
planning services, the state Commissioners of Administration and
Finance, under the direction of the State Treasurer, refused payment
because of the university's failure to comply with the state designer
selection board act.
The 1976 session of the Minnesota Legislature added another
dimension to the controversy by making its $4,897,489 appropriation
to the university for completion of the learning resources center
expressly conditional upon the university's compliance with the designer selection board act. 73
The Board of Regents then brought an action in state district
court, seeking a declaration that the designer selection board act
violated the Regents' authority under the Minnesota Constitution,
and an injunction against the withholding of construction project
appropriations from the university for its failure to comply with the
act.
The basis for the Regents' challenge was a section of the Minnesota Constitution which states as follows: "All the rights, immunities,
franchises and endowments heretofore granted or conferred are hereby perpetuated unto the . . . university . ...
74 This language had
earlier been held by the Minnesota Supreme Court -in State ex rel.
University of Minnesota v. Chase75 to carry forward the authority
of the Board of Regents: for the "government" of the university
under its original charter, with the power and duty "to enact laws
' 76
for the government of the university.
The district court granted a summary judgment to the Regents,
holding that both the state designer selection board act and the condition requiring the university's compliance with it in the learning
resources center appropriation measure were in violation of the
autonomy granted the university under the constitutional provisions
regarding the Board of Regents.
The state appealed the case to the Minnesota Supreme Court,
which reversed the district court by a 5-4 vote, holding that the
requirement that the state designer selection board select designers
for university buildings is a valid exercise of legislative authority
over appropriations made to the university, since the legislature has
the power to impose reasonable conditions on the use of appropriated
funds.
In its analysis of the "reasonableness" of the condition requiring
73. 1976 Minn. Laws ch. 348.
74. MINN. CONST. art. 13, § 3.
75. 175 Minn. 259.220 N.11. 951 (1928).
76. State ex rel. Univ. of Minn. v. Chase. 175 Minn. 259, citing 1851 Minn. Laws ch. 3, §§ 4, 9.

, 220 N.W. 951, 955 (1928),
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compliance with the designer selection board act, the court began
by quoting from the Chase opinion as follows: "At the one extreme,
the legislature has no power to make effective, in the form of law,
a mere direction of academic policy or administration. At the other
extreme it has the undoubted right within reason to condition appro77
priations as it sees fit."
While the Chase opinion contemplated the possibility of valid
legislative conditions in appropriations to the university, the actual
holding in that case invalidated a legislative act. The measure in
question had authorized the State Auditor "to supervise and control"
expenditures by all "departments, and agencies of the state government and of the institutions under their control." 7 8 The act also
required the approval by the State Commission of Administration
and Finance of an "estimate" before any appropriation to a unit of
the state could become "avaliable for expenditure. " 7' 9 When the commission disapproved an expense incurred by the Regents for a preliminary survey of an employee group insurance plan, the Regents
brought a mandamus action, and the Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment for the Regents, holding that
the act was an unconstitutional attempt by the legislature to interfere
with the independent management authority of the Board of Regents.
This holding was distinguished by the court in Lord as involving
a "direct attempt to control all university expenditures, rather
than the limited conditions imposed by the designer selection board
act."" ° In stating the question to be resolved, the court also emphasized the need to examine the impact of the measure on the discretion and power of the Regents over the internal management of the
university.
The court then discussed the purposes of the state designer selection board act. Its primary intent, according to the court, was "to
avoid the conflicts of interest which arise when members of a state
agency select a firm in which they have an interest, be it financial
or otherwise." 8 1 The university was perhaps uniquely affected by
this objective because of the fact noted earlier in the court's opinion
that the university had entered into several contracts with architectural firms which included faculty members in the university's
School of Architecture.
Second, the court indicated that the provisions in the act defining
the membership of the designer selection board to include represent77.
78.
79.

175 Minn. at 261, 220 N.W. at 952.
1925 _11inn. Laws Ch.' 426, art. 3, § 3.
Id. § 5.

S0.

Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. Lord, -

81.

Id.

Minn

-

,

257 N.W.2d 796, 802 (1977).
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atives of engineering, architecture, and the arts were designed to
insure competency in the selection process.
Third, the court noted the act's requirement that selection criteria be made public and that the selection process follow certain
defined procedures.
The purpose of the act, according to the court, was "to promote
the general welfare and to prevent conflicts of interest and fraudulent acts. '82 Considering also the application of the act to all public
agencies in the state, and not just the university, 3 the court found
the requirement to be a reasonable and limited condition for the
legislature to impose.
The court noted, however, that the act would not apply to the
university if it "were providing all funds for the construction of a
building from its own revenues ...."84
Moreover, the court held that the Board of Regents must be consulted during the negotiations between the designer selection board
and the designer ultimately selected for a university project, and
that the contract with the designer must be specifically approved
for both form and content by the Regents before it can be executed.
Furthermore, the court ruled that the university "certainly has the
right to direct his actions [the designer's] and to reject any design
' 85
it finds unsuitable.
While the validity of legislative action was basically upheld by
the court, it was actually subject to the condition in the opinion that
the final authority of the Regents (and their exclusive authority, in
the case of projects funded by the university's own revenues) be
accomodated in a manner not specifically provided for in the act.
C. SOUTH DAKOTA

The most recent ruling of the South Dakota Supreme Court on
the question of constitutional autonomy occurred in 1975, in Board of
86
Regents v. Carter.
That case was brought by the Board of Regents
as a challenge to the authority of the state Commissioner of Labor
and Management Relations (Carter) to rule on the definition of appropriate employee representation units and certify the designation
82.

Id.

83. This Is significant because of the court's earifer reference to an apparent principle
that ". . . legislation aimed at a university alone or against an activity peculiar to the
university would be Invalid." Id., citing Peters v. Mich. State College, 320 Mich. 243, 30
N.W.2d 854 (1948)(by Implication).
84. Minn. at-,
257 N.W.2d at 803. While not cited as authority at this point,
a case referred to earlier in the court's opinion, Fanning v. Univ. of Minn., 183 Minn.
222, 236 N.W. 217 (1931), directly supports this principle. That case upheld the university's right to use rental proceeds from campus buildirgs and earnings from the university press to finance the construction of a dormitory on the campus without securing
legislative appropriation of the funds or approval for the construction.
85. -%Minn.
at , 257 N.W.2d at 803.
86.
SD
, 228 N.W.2d 621 (1975).
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under the state's collective bargainor selection of representative units
8 7
ing act for public employees.
The Regents argued that such a legislative grant of authority
was inconsistent with their charter in the state constitution, which
specified that all state-supported educational institutions "shall be
under the control of a board of five members appointed by the
Governor and confirmed by the senate under such rules and restrictions as the legislature may provide. ' 8 s According to the Regents,
the legislature's power under this section only extended to placing
rules and restrictions on the appointment and confirmation process.
The court disagreed directly with this last contention, stating
that it has consistently recognized the "rules and restrictions" phrase
to also modify the word "control," so that it authorized some legislative restraint of the Board's constitutional power of control over
the institutions.8 9 The court indicated that such restraint was itself
limited and that the legislature's "rules and restrictions" could not
"erase" the Board's control or remove all of its power. 90
Proceeding then to an analysis of the public employee bargaining
law, the court noted that it only required the Board to negotiate in
good faith with a representative employee unit. Since this obligation
was defined in the law to mean providing a rationale for any position
taken during negotiations, and not the making of a concession or
necessarily agreeing to any proposal, the court interpreted this to
mean that the Regents' power "to unilaterally set salaries, discharge
employees, or establish employment qualifications is left intact."
The court concluded that the Regents' "basic right of control" was
therefore "left untouched," so it held that the act was "a permissable
restriction on the exercise of that control."' 1
Another question in Carter was raised by the state attorney general who intervened to protest the Regents' action of hiring independent legal counsel in the case. While the court acknowledged the
constitutional authority of the attorney general as the legal officer
.

87.. S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. ch. 3-18 (1974).
88. S.D. CONST. art. XIV, § 3.
89.Board of Regents v. Carter, S.D., , 228 NW.2d 621, 627 (1975), citing
Worzella v. Bd. of Regents of Educ., 77 S.D. 447, 43 NV.2d 411 (1958) ; Boe v. Foss, 76
S.D. 295, 77 N.W.2d 1 (1956); State College Dev. Ass'n v. Nissen, 66 S.D. 287, 281 N.W.
907 (193q) ; State v. Dailey, 57 S.D.. 554, 234 N.W. 45 (1931) ; Johnson v. Jones, 52 S.D.
64, 216 NW. 584 (1927).
90. -S.D.
at -,
228 N.W.2d at 628.
91. Id. The dissenting opinion by Justice W~ollman, joined by Justice Winans, argues
that the board's control could in fact be invaded to an unconstitutional extent by a provision In the law directing the department of manpower affairs to issue a binding order
]
after its Investigation an' hearing of an unresolved employee grievance. The concurring
opinion by Justice Bregelmeier indicate- that the decision of the regents, after having
heard the employees' position, "is not subject to further review, regulation, or any other
of the restrictions in S D.C..L. .1-18, which of necessitii incltude those mentioned in the
dissent." Id. at , 228 N.W.2d at 630 (emphasis added). Since three of the five Justices thus objected to the binding order procedure, Carter should not be read to uphold
the constitutionality of that provision.

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

of the state, it pointed out that such authority had to be reconciled
with the legislature's power to make rules regarding the form of
the Regents' control. Since one of those rules was a statute giving
the Board of Regents the power to sue and be sued, 92 the court held
that such power necessarily includes the power to hire its own attorney, even without the consent of the attorney general.
This ruling of the South Dakota Supreme Court regarding the
constitutional autonomy of the state's Board of Regents thus makes
it clear that the Board's authority is 'subject to legislative definition
as well as limitation, although neither may be so expansive as to
interfere with the basic right of the Board to "control" the educational institutions under its jurisdiction.
In addition to the public employee negotiation process involved
in Carter, a more recent lower court decision in South Dakota found
another area of legislative authority to not be violative of the con93
stitutional autonomy of the Board of Regents. In Hines v. DeZonia,
a state circuit court held that the Board (and hence the University
of South Dakota School of Medicine under its jurisdiction) is a state
"agency" subject to the state Administrative Procedures Act.9

4

The

court accordingly enjoined the School from dismissing the medical
student who brought the case until such time as the School promulgated rules for academic dismissals in accordance with the Act.
The significance of this case may be somewhat diminished by the
fact noted in the court's opinion that the Board's own regulations
on student discipline and academic standing required that any rules
of implementation be promulgated in accordance with the provisions
of the Administrative Procedures Act.
Another conflict in South Dakota surfaced at the August 1977
meeting of the Board of Regents. Inspired by the Exon decision in
their neighboring state, and frustrated by the increasing involvement
of South Dakota state agencies in campus affairs, the Regents unanimously directed their attorney to draft a lawsuit resolution for their
consideration. 5 A specific point of contention at the time involved
a decision by the state Personnel Bureau to re-audit the institutions of higher education in the fall, and the Commissioner
of Higher Education was reported to have stated that the Personnel
Bureau auditors would be escorted off the campuses if they tried to
conduct another audit.9 8 Within a week of the Board of Regents'

meeting, the state attorney general was quoted as saying that the
Regents were subject to the authority of executive agencies and
92.
93.
94.
Univ.
95.
96.

S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 13-49-11 (1975).
S.D. Cir. Ct. (Ist Jud'. Cir. 1976).
S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. ch. 1-26 (1974). Accord, Assoc. Students of Boise State
v. Idaho State Bd. of Educ., Case No. 57554, Idaho Dist. Ct., (4th Jud'. Dist. 1976).
Fargo Forum, Aut.
20, 1977, at 20, col. 6.
Fargo Forum, Aug. 24, 1977, at 13, col. 6.
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'9
that he didn't think "anybody will be escorting anybody any place."
The Regents subsequently decided to defer any further consideration
of a lawsuit until an attempt had been made to resolve their differ98
ences with state agencies through legislation.

D.

MONTANA

The legal status of the state governing board for higher education in Montana was changed significantly by the adoption of a new
state constitution in 1972. Under the old constitution the "general
control and supervision" of the state education institutions was vested
in a state board of education "whose powers and duties shall be
prescribed by law." '99 The new constitution describes the responsibility of the board in much broader terms:
The government and control of the Montana university system
is vested in a board of regents of higher education which shall
have full power, responsibility, and authority to supervise, coordinate, manage and control the Montana university and shall
supervise and coordinate other public educational institutions
assigned by law. 100
In contrast to the old constitution, the only reference in the new
chapter to a legislative role in higher education is the following provision, which is quite limited: "The funds and appropriations under
the control of the board of regents are subject to the same audit
provisions as are all other state funds."' 01 1
These provisions of the new constitution were considered by the
Montana Supreme Court in Board of Regents of Higher Education
v. Judge,'0 2 an action brought by the Board seeking a declaratory
judgment regarding the constitutionality of several measures approved by the Montana Legislature in 1975.
The measures in question required that the Board secure the
approval of the Legislative Finance Committee before expending in
excess of amounts appropriated or making certain other budget
amendments,oa and certify to the budget director compliance by the
institutions with certain conditions related to the use of the appropri04
ated funds.
97. Id.
98. Letter from David Figuli, Ass't. Att'y Gen., S.D. Bd. of Regents, to the author
(Nov. 29, 1977).
99. MONT. CONST. art. XI § 11 (1889).
100. MoN.
CONST. art. X § 9(2) (a). See Schaefer, The Legal Status of the Montana
Utuversit,! System under the New Montana Constitution, 35 MONT. L. REv. 189 (1974).
101. MONT. CONST. art. X § 9(2)(d).
102. 168 Mont. 433, 543 P.2d 1323 (1975).
103. Mont. H.B. 271, § 1(3) (1975) ; Mont. S.B. 401, § 2 (1975).
104. Mont. H.B. 271, § 12 (1975).
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In considering the budget amendment approval question, the
court deemed it necessary to identify the funds subject to the appropriation power. The court thus considered provisions in the 1972 constitution that call for a governor's budget to be submitted to the
legislature "setting forth in detail for all operating funds the proposed expenditures and estimated revenue of the state" 10 5 and that
require the legislature to "insure strict accountability of all revenue
received and money spent by the state."10 61 The result, according to
the court, is that the legislature's appropriation power "extends beyond the general fund and encompasses all those public operating
funds of state government" except for "private funds received by
state government which are restricted by law, trust agreement or
contract."

07

Having thus clarified one limitation of the appropriation power,
the court created another by holding that the budget amendment approval process approved by the legislature was an unconstitutional
delegation of its power to the Finance Committee. 10 8
The court related the certification question to the power of the
legislature to make line item appropriations, since the certification
requirement at issue was preceded by a statement of legislative
purpose "to restrict and limit . . . the amount and conditions under

which the appropriations can be expended."' 0' 9 Although the Board of
Regents had argued that its constitutional autonomy precluded appropriations from being restricted on a line item basis, the court
held otherwise, stating that the legislative exercise of control over
expenditures goes "hand in hand" with the appropriation power.
The court acknowledged, however, that line item appropriations
would be impermissible if they involved such a degree of legislative
control over expenditures as to infringe upon the Regents' authority
to "supervise, coordinate, manage and control" institutions under
its jurisdiction.
Following the same line of reasoning, the court also held that
the legislature had the authority to impose certain conditions on its
appropriations and to require certification of compliance with those
conditions, so long as the conditions "do not infringe on the constitutional powers granted the Regents." 0 The court then scrutinized
each of the conditions imposed by the 1975 legislature and held the
following to be unconstitutional:
105.
106.

107.
1331
108.
1317
109.
110.

MONT. CONST. art. VI, § 9.
Id. art. VIII, § 12.

Board of Regents of Higher Educ. v. Judge, 168 Mont. 433, -,
543 P.2d 1323,
(1975).
Id., citing State ex rel. Judge v. Legislative Fin. Comm., 168 Mont. 470, 543 P.2d
(1975).
Mont. H.B. 271, § 12 (1975).
168 Mont. at, 543 P.2d at 1333.
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First, a requirement that "[a]ll moneys collected or received by
university system units subject to this act from any source whatsoever, including federal grants for research and operations, and any
moneys received from a foundation shall be deposited in the state
treasury. . . ."III This provision was in conflict with the general
principle discussed earlier that private moneys restricted by law,
trust agreement or contract are not subject to appropriation.
Second, a prohibition of more than a five percent salary increase
for university presidents and the commissioner of higher education
during each year of the biennium. 11 2 The court reasoned that control
of such salaries was not a "minor" matter, but rather an effort to
dictate personnel policy in violation of the Board's authority.
Third, a requirement that "[t]he Regents shall grant classified
university employees salaries in accord with House Joint Resolution
37. ... .*"1 An inherent responsibility of the Board under its constitutional powers is the determination of priorities in higher education,
according to the court, and this attempted legislative condition impaired the Regent's power to function effectively by establishing
policies and determining priorities related to the hiring and retention
of competent personnel.
The holdings in Judge affirming the legislative power to make
line item appropriations and conditional appropriations mean that
the Montana Legislature can be expected to exercise a great deal of
influence on the university system in the state. The case reveals a
considerable amount of judicial respect for the broad scope of control
and authority granted to the Board of Regents under the 1972 constitution, however, and the appropriation power will accordingly have
to be exercised with some restraint in order to avoid any further
challenge.
E. MICHIGAN

In October 1975, the Supreme Court of Michigan added another
significant decision to a long line of opinions regarding the constitutional autonomy of higher education institutions in that state. 114 University of Michigan v. State" 5 was a declaratory action brought by
the constitutionally established universities to determine the validity
of several provisions of the State Higher Education Appropriation
Act of 1971,116 and the Michigan State Board of Education intervened
as a defendent to raise the question of its constitutional authority
111. Mont. H.B. 271, § 12(4) (1975).
112. Id. at 6.
113. Id.
114. S-e capes cited infra notes 132, 137, 142 and 150.
115. 395 Mich. 52, 235 N.W.2d ' 1 (1975), reviewed in Note, Regents v. State of Michigan:
A Matter of Politics and Power, 111 DET. CL. Rnv. 593 (1976).
116. 1971 Mich. Pub. Acts ch. 122.
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with respect to the universities. The constitutional language relied
upon by the universities stated that each of their governing boards
"shall have general supervision of its institution and the control and
direction of all expenditures from the institution's funds." 117
Several of the appropriation act provisions challenged by the
universities made it an express "condition" of the appropriation that
the number of out-of-state students be limited in certain respects,11 8
that none of the appropriated funds be used to construct buildings
not authorized by the legislature, 1 9 and that the general fund subsidy
appropriated for an institution be automatically reduced by the
amount of any tuition or student fee revenue not reported for budget
20
purposes.1
Both the trial and appellate courts had found these conditions to
be an unconstitutional infringement of the universities' autonomy, 1 2
but the Michigan Supreme Court noted that the statement of express
"conditions" in the 1971 act had been changed in subsequent appropriations acts to declarations of "legislative intent." Since the legislature clearly has the right to merely state its intent or wishes, according to the court, no constitutional conflict existed at the time of
the decision, and the court declined to rule on the questions raised
122
by the universities regarding the "conditions.'
Another appropriation act provision challenged by the universities prohibited their letting of any construction contract for a selfliquidating project unless they had first submitted "schedules for the
liquidation of the debt for the construction and operation of such
project ' 123 to the appropriate legislative committees. The court described this as a "mere reporting measure" and noted that there
was no requirement of legislative supervision or control. Given also
the legitimacy of the legislature's interest in the information, the
provision was held by the court to be constitutional.
The final appropriation act question considered by the court was
a prohibition of the use of the appropriated funds to "pay for the
construction, maintenance or operation of any self-liquidating projects."" 24 The court refused to rule on that question, due to the lack
of any specific facts or impasse that would provide a contest for its
117.

MICH. CONST. art. 8, § 5.

118.

It

is a

condition of this appropriation that no college or university having an

enrollment of out of state students in excess of 20% of their total enrollment
shall Increase their enrollment of out of state students In either actual num119.
120.
121.

ber or percentage over the actual numbers and percentages that were enrolled in the 1970-71 school year. 1971 Mich. Pub. Acts ch. 122, § 13.
Id. § 20.
Id. § 26.
Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Michigan, 47 Mich. App. 23, 208 N.W.2d 871 (1973).

122. Id.
123. 1971 Mich. Pub. Acts ch. 122, § 20.
124.

1d.
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decision. In very strong language, however, the court indicated that
the universities "would be wise to comply" with the "perfectly
proper" expression of the legislature's desire to separate the funding
of self-liquidating and state-funded projects. Because of the power
of the purse held by the legislature, the court warned the universities
of the "understandable legislative reaction" that would result from
their disregard of the provision. Rather than a legal question that
could be judicially resolved, therefore, the court described the matter as "one of power and politics" from which it should abstain.
The question raised by the State Board of Education required a
reconciliation of the constitutional grant of autonomy to the universities with the following grant of constitutional authority to the Board:
Leadership and general supervision over all public education, including adult education and instructional programs in
state institutions, except as to institutions of higher education granting baccalaureate degrees, is vested in a state
board of education. It shall serve as the general planning
and coordinating body for all public education, including higher education, and shall advise the legislature as to the financial requirements in connection therewith.
• . . The power
cation provided
tive institutions
the institutions'

of the boards of institutions of higher eduin this constitution to supervise their respecand control and direct the expenditure of
funds shall not be limited by this section. 12 5

Since the universities were excepted from the Board's "general
supervision" by the express terms of this provision, the court analyzed the impact of the other designated responsibilities of "leadership," "general planning and coordination," and advising the legislature. In light of the specific language negating any limitation of
the university boards' powers of supervision and control, the court
held that the State Board of Education could act as an advisory
body to the universities, but without any power to veto their programs. In order for the Board to properly fulfill its constitutional
mandate of advising the legislature, the court noted that the universities must inform the Board of any proposed programs and their
financial requirements.
A very important element of this decision by the Michigan Supreme Court is its recognition of the significance of the political
factors involved. 1 26 In addition to its acknowledgement of the legislative power of the purse, the court indicated in the following paragraph the necessity *for mutual respect between the legislature and
125. MICH. CONST. art. 8, § 3.
126.

See 111 DE'T. C.L. REV., supra note 115, at 593.
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the university governing boards in their exercise of overlapping
responsibilities:
This case arises because two important elements of our
government, the legislature and the universities, are zealous
to perform well their constitutional missions in the service
of the people. The legislature has taken certain action pursuant to its responsibilities to supervise properly the spending
of the people's money. The universities seek to maintain their
constitutional integrity to manage funds given into their
charge in order best to perform their educational mission.
It is, obvious that these two functions can touch or overlap
each other. Therefore understanding and good will is necessary that
the people whom both elements represent be
served.127
Following the state supreme court decision in Regents, the Michigan Court of Appeals was asked to resolve a question regarding the
constitutional autonomy of public community and junior college
boards in that state. Kowalski v. Board of Trustees of Macomb
County Community College 128 held that the constitutional language
indicating that such colleges "shall be supervised and controlled by
locally elected boards"129 meant that the boards had the authority
to set tuition rates in excess of a legislatively prescribed schedule.
The court reasoned that this language was "almost identical" with
the constitutional language considered in Regents and that, although
the supreme court's opinion did not address the issue, the court of
appeals decision in that case had held that the Board of Regents
had the authority to establish tuition rates."30
IV. PRINCIPLES OF AUTONOMY AND THEIR APPLICATION TO
NORTH DAKOTA LEGISLATION
In comparison with the grants of constitutional authority involved
in the cases reviewed from neighboring states, the North Dakota
Board of Higher Education seems to be granted powers by article
54 that are at least as broad and independent.13' The principles established in those cases thus have some significance in North Dakota
as well, especially in light of the relatively little judicial interpretation of article 54 to date. Having been described in more detail during the discussion of those cases, the principles will now be summarized and illustrated.
127.
128.
129..
130.
131.

University of Mich. v. State, 395 Mich. 52, , 235 N.W.2d 1, 12 (1975).
67 Mich. App. 74, 240 N.W.2d 272 (1976).
MICH. CONST. art. 8, § 7.
Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Michigan, 47 Mich. App. 23, 208 N.W.2d 871 (1973).
The language of article 54 may be compared with the similar constitutional pro-

visions of those other states by examining the text accompanying notes 19 and 20 (article
54), 42 (Nebraska), 74 and 75 (Minnesota), 88 (South Dakota), 100 (Montana), and
117

(Michigan).
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A.

REASONABLE

CONDITIONS OF LEGISLATIVE APPROPRIATIONS

First, the courts agree that the legislature may attach reasonable
to a constituconditions to its appropriations of state general funds
132
tional board or an institution under its jurisdiction.
Several examples of legislative action in accordance with this
principle can be found in the measures approved by the 1977 session
of the North Dakota Legislature. For example, the following expression of "legislative intent" in the appropriations bill approved for
the institutions of higher education would appear to qualify as a
reasonable condition, since it is directly related to the extent and
manner in which the funds are to be used:
SECTION 10. LEGISLATIVE INTENT. It is the intent of
the legislative assembly that if the department of vocational
education has funds available to fund the admission counselor II position at the state school of forestry on a fifty
percent ratio basis with the state, upon receiving such funds
from the department of vocational education, the state school
of forestry shall return to the general fund fifty percent of
the general fund appropriation included in its budget to fund
the admission counselor's position. 133
The appropriations bill for the Board of Higher Education itself
also contains a "reasonable condition," given its close relationship
to the use of the appropriated funds:
SECTION 2. APPROPRIATION. The moneys appropriated
in accordance with budget categories for salaries and wages
pertaining to workload change, different services, or added
facilities shall be made available only after certification to
the executive office of the budget that such changes, services, or facilities have been added, or that newly anticipated
34
employees are actually in the employ of the state.
B.

LEGISLATIVE EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER

35
Given the deference by the Minnesota Supreme Court in Lord
to the public purposes of the state designer selection board act and
8
the affirmance by the Sourth Dakota Supreme Court in Carter1 of
a public employee bargaining act, a second principle of the educational autonomy cases might be that a constitutionally established
132. Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. State, 395 Mich. 52, 235 N.W.2d 1 (1975); Regents
of Univ. of Minn. v. Lord, --- Minn.-, 257 N.W.2d 796 (1977); Accord, State Bd. of
Agriculture v. State Admin. Bd., 226 Mich. 417, 197 N.W. 160 (1924) ; Board of Regents v.
Auditor Gen., 167 Mich. 444, 132 N.W. 1037 (1911).
133. 1977 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 24.
134. Id. ch. 25.
Minn.--, 257 N.W.2d 796 (1977).
135. Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. Lord, 228 N.W.2d 621 (1975).
136. Board of Regents v. Carter, -S.D.-.
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governing board will be subject to a legislative exercise of its police
power to ensure the public health and welfare, even if the act is
13 7
not related to any appropriation of funds.
One example of permissible legislation under this principle was
the action taken by the North Dakota Legislature in 1977 to ensure
appropriate marking of parking spaces provided by public agencies
for motor vehicles operated by physically handicapped persons.138
Another example from the 1977 session was the legislature's approval
of an act reauiring designation of a no-smoking area "for the comfort and health of the persons not smoking" in every place of public
assembly. 139 Both of these measures apply to all public agencies in
the state, including those under the State Board of Higher Education.
Other bills that apparently would have been constitutional exercises of legislative authority in accordance with this principle, although they were not approved by the 1977 legislature, would have
authorized public employee bargaining 1'40 and required equal employ41
ment opportunity in both public and private sectors.'
C. LEGISLATIVE INVASION OR DELEGATION OF MANAGEMENT AUTHORITY

The legislative powers of appropriation and public policy must
be balanced against the constitutional powers of governing boards,
which leads to a third principle of the autonomy cases. This third
principle is that the legislature may not invade the management
authority of a constitutional board, or delegate -such authority to
142
another officer or agency.
An example of a legislative action that may violate this principle can also be found in the 1977 appropriations act for the institutions of higher education:
SECTION 11. LEGISLATIVE INTENT. The forty-fifth legislative assembly hereby expresses its intent that the board of
higher education take such actions and direct expenditures
137. Accord, Regents of Univ. of Mich. v. Michigan Employee Relations Comm'n, 389
Mich. 96, 204 N.W.2d 218 (1973)
(public employee bargaining act) ; Regents of Univ. of
Mich. v. Labor Mediation Bd., 18 Mich. App. 485, 171 N.W.2d 477 (1969) (public employee
bargaining act) ; Branum v. State, 5 Mich. Ap. 124, 145 N.W.2d 860 (1966)
(legislative
waiver of immunity): Peters v. Michigan State College, 320 Mich. 243, 30 N.W.2d 854
(1948)
(affirmance of workmen's compensation act by an equally divided court).
138. N.D. Cer.
CODE § 39-01-15 (Supp. 1977).
139. Id. § 23-12-10.
140. N.D. H.B. 1471 (1977).
141. N.D. S.B. 2045 (1977).
142. Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. Lord, Minn., 257 N.W.2d 796 (1977); Board
of Regents of Higher Educ. v. Judge, 168 Mont. 413, 543 P.2d 1323 (1975) : and Board of
Regents v. Carter, 228 N.W.2d 621 (1975) : Accord, Associated Students of Univ. of Colo.
v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., Colo., 543 P.2d 59 (1975): State Bd. of Agric. v.
State Admin. Bd., 226 Mich. 417, 197 N.W. 160 (1924): Bd. of Regents v. Auditor Gen.,
167 Mich. 415, 129 N.NY. 713 (1911) ; Sterling v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 110 Mich. 369,
68 N.W. 253 (1996); Weinberg v. Regents of Univ. of Mich., 97 Mich. 246, 56 N.W. 605
(1893); Kowalski v. Bd. of Trustees of Macomb County Community College, 67' Mich.
App. 74, 240 N.WV.2d 272 (1976) : State ex rel. Univ. of Minn. v. Chase, 175 Minn. 259, 22)
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to coordinate and correlate the work in the different institutions under its control and direction to prevent wasteful
duplication and to develop cooperation among the institutions
in the exchange of instructors and students as required by
subsection 9 of section 15-10-17 of the North Dakota Century
Code. The board of higher education shall prepare a report
which sets forth the method and procedure by which unnecessary duplication within the colleges and universities under
the board's, control will be eliminated. This report
14 3 shall be
submitted to the forty-sixth legislative assembly.
However understandable the legislative concern may be, its expression like this in the form of a mandate that the Board "take
... actions and direct expenditures . . . to prevent wasteful duplication" appears to be an unconstitutional attempt to exercise the
management authority of the Board. The attempt is even more
questionable in light of the specific provision in section 6(b) of
article 54 that the Board "shall... do each and everything necessary
and proper for the efficient and economic administration of said
state educational institutions."
And, while the simple requirement of a report to the legislature
may be sufficiently removed from the Board's management authority
to qualify as a "reasonable condition," the report in this case must
set forth "the method and procedure by which unnecessary duplication . . . will be eliminated.'' 14 4 This appears to tie the report so
closely to the management action requirement that both may be
invalid. Although the entire expression of "legislative intent" may
thus be unconstitutional as a directive, it should be noted that it
may retain some practical utility as an advisory statement to the
145
Board.
A related declaration of legislative intent in the same bill provides an interesting comparison:
SECTION 12. LEGISLATIVE INTENT. It is the intent of the
legislative assembly that the board of higher education study
and determine whether the number of educational institutions under its control and direction exceeds the needs of
higher education in this state. It is the intent of the legislative assembly that the board of higher education prepare a
report which sets forth their findings and submit the report
to the forty-sixth legislative assembly.'4 8
N.W. 951 (1928).. See Regents of
(1975); and Regents of Univ. of
Mich. 96, 204 N.W.2d 218 (1973).
143. 1977 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 24.
144. Id. (emphasis added).
145. Accord, Regents of Univ. of
Board of Regents of Univ. of Neb. v.
146. 1977 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 24.

Univ. of Mich. v. State, 395 Mich. 52, 235 N.W.2d' 1
Mich. v. Michigan Employee Relations Comm'n, 389

Mich. v. State, 395 Mich. 52, 235 N.W..2d 1 (1975)
Exon, 199 Neb. 146, 256 N.W.2d 330 (1977).
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While this statement directs the board to "study and determine"
if there are more institutions than necessary and to prepare and
submit a report of its findings, it does not direct the Board to exercise any of its management authority to resolve the problem. This
provision thus appears to be more defensible than the previous one.
Another measure before the North Dakota Legislature in 1977
would have infringed upon the authority of the State Board of Higher
Education in a much different and more significant manner. Senate
Bill 2286 proposed an amendment of the statutory powers and duties
of the Board to prohibit it from granting tenure to any faculty
member or other employee hired after January 1, 1977. The bill's
sponsor indicated that his concern was to ensure that the Board
had the ability to reduce the number of faculty at institutions suffering a decline in student enrollments. 147 That concern can certainly
be related to the amount of appropriated funds that the Board would
authorize such institutions to request from the Legislature. Approval
of the measure would have been a clear invasion of the Board's
"full authority over the institutions under its control," however, and
the fact that the bill failed to pass the Senate only for lack of a
constitutional majority (on a 24-24 vote) is an indication of the lack
of legislative appreciation for the scope of the Board's autonomy on
such matters.
Another example of a lack of legislative understanding of the
Board's authority was an act sponsored by 51 members of the North
Dakota House of Representatives and approved by the 1969 Legislature that required all of the institutions "under the direction and control" of the Board, except the University of North Dakota, to adopt the
quarter system of academic terms. 148 Although several years old,
the act is mentioned here because it continues to present a problem
for the Board and the institutions under its jurisdiction. At its January 1978 meeting the Board authorized the preparation of a bill that
would amend the 1969 act to permit the Board to designate the
41 9
academic term for each institution. '
D.

LEGISLATIVE APPROPRIATION OF INSTITUTIONAL EARNINGS

A fourth principal to be derived from the autonomy cases is that
earnings from institutional operations constitute a trust fund under
the control of a constitutional board, and are not subject to legislati-ve appropriation or limitation. 150
147. Fargo Forum, Jan. 28, 1977, at 14, col. 2.
148. 1969 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 197.
149. North Dakota State Bd. of Higher Educ., Minutes of Jan. 12, 1978 at 12.
150. Regents of Univ. of Minn. v. Lord, -Minn.-,
257 N.W.2d 796 (1977)
Board
of Regents of Univ. cf Neb. v. Exon, 199 Neh. 146. 256 N.W.2d 330 (1977) ; Accord, State
Bd. of Agric. v.
Fuller, 180 Mich. 349, 147 N.W. 529 (1914); Fanning v.
Univ. of
Minn., 183 Minn. 222, 236 N.W. 217 (1931): State ex rel. Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 86 N.M.
359,. 524 P.2d 975 (1974). Cf. Board of Regents of Higher Edluc. v. Judge, 168 Mont. 433,
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Contrary to this principle, the practice of the 1977 legislature
was to include such institutional earnings in appropriation bills. In
the measure appropriating funds to the institutions of higher education, for example, the following statements are made:
SECTION 1. APPROPRIATIONS. There is hereby appropriated the sums herein specified, derived from institutional
income and institutional collections, and derived from rent,
interest, or income from land, money or property donated
or granted by the United States and allocated to the institutions of higher learning under the terms of the Enabling
Act and the state constitution ...
MEDICAL CENTER REHABILITATION HOSPITAL
There is hereby appropriated out of any moneys not otherwise appropriated, derived from gifts, grants, contracts sales,
services, and other income from the University of North
Dakota medical center rehabilitation hospital . . . to pay the
general expenses, operation, maintenance, and equipment
for the biennium....
Any additional income not required by law to be deposited
in the operating fund in the state treasury . . . is hereby
appropriated."
SECTION 7. APPROPRIATION. Any federal funds which can
be used for the purpose of providing equal opportunities in
programs as mandated by Title IX that may become available to the institutions of higher education . . . are hereby
151
appropriated.
In addition, the appropriations act for the extension division and
experiment stations includes a provision that, "[any additional income including funds from the federal government and gifts and
donations from private sources received by the North Dakota main
experiment station, branch stations, and the cooperative extension
division . . . are hereby appropriated for the purpose designated
in the gift, grant, or donation ....
,,152
While the practical effect of such "appropriations" of institutional income in violation of the autonomy principle may simply be
that they were unnecessary, there were also instances in which the
legislature attempted to restrict the Board's control over such funds
in apparent violation of its constitutional authority. For example,
the experiment station appropriations act states that,
543 P.2d 1323 (1975). See also State ex rel. Ledwith v. Brian, 84 Neb. 30, 120 N.W. 916
(1909) ; State ex rel. Spencer Lens Co. v. Searle, 77 Neb. 155, 109 N.W. 770 (1906).
151. 1977 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 24.
152. Id. ch. 25, § 1.
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S.
[plublic moneys from local sources, which shall include receipts from sale of grains, personal services, dairy
products, livestock, and other agricultural products at the
North Dakota main experiment station, branch experiment
-stations, and cooperative extension division, may be expended
in excess of that specifically appropriated through biennial
appropriations bills of the legislative assembly only in the
event that an authorization has first been received from the
subcommittee on budget of the legislative council.15
Finally, the following provisions of the institutional appropriations act are examples of legislative action that is justifiable to a
certain extent as a "reasonable condition" on the use of appropriated
general funds, but which is also subject to challenge to the extent
that it restricts the Board's use of institutional income:
SECTION 5. LEGISLATIVE INTENT. It is the intent of the
legislative assembly that the colleges and universities pay
special assessments from their plant improvement moneys.
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 40-23-22, no funds
shall be expended to pay special assessments on projects that
do not directly serve a state institution and are not located
on or contiguous to a state institution, wherever located in
the state.H
SECTION 6. LEGISLATIVE INTENT. The legislative assembly recognizes the need for flexibility in coordination
of the use of appropriated funds and nonappropriated funds
for the development of the medical school; however, it is
the intent of the legislative assembly that any proposed departure from the priorities established for development of
the medical school residency program be approved by the
budget5 section of the legislative council prior to implementa5
tion.1
The autonomy cases reviewed in this article would support the
right of a legislature to require that a particular line item appropriation to be used for payment of certain kinds of special assessments,
and the legislative prerogative to approve priorities for the use of
state general funds in the development of a medical school would
also seem clear. To the extent that the legislative conditions attempt
to restrict the Board from allocating institutional income for the
payment of special assessments or medical school development, how153.

Id. (emphasis added).

154. Id.
ch. 24. City of Fargo v. State, 260 N.W.2d 333 (N.D. 1977), held that this section did not make an appropriation as required by section 186 of the constitution for payment of the assessment in question, but the court did not indicate whether its holding as.
sumed that this section was limited in scope and application to state general fund monies.
That would be a logical assumption, however, given the autonomy principle discussed In
this section.
155. 1977 N.D. Sess. Laws ch. 24.
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ever, the autonomy cases indicate that there has been an invalid
infringement of the Board's constitutional authority to control and administer the institutions.
V. CONCLUSION
The vote of the citizens of North Dakota in 1938 to establish
the State Board of Higher Education as a constitutional body was
clearly intended to remove higher education from the political sphere.
Since that time, there have been only a few decisions by the North
Dakota Supreme Court regarding the authority of the Board under
article 54 of the state constitution, and these have not dealt with
the relative authority of the Board and the legislature regarding the
institutions assigned to the Board's control and administration by
article 54. In nearby states with similar constitutional provisions,
however, there have been several recent judicial decisions that define the scope of constitutional autonomy granted to higher education governing boards.
These decisions indicate that a grant of autonomy is significant,
and the constitutional authority of a governing board to control,
manage, administer, or supervise the institutions under its jurisdiction may not be invaded or interfered with by a state legislature.
At the same time, the courts make it clear that the appropriation
and police powers of a legislature remain intact and may be exercised with considerable influence on the operation and activities of
the institutions governed by a constitutionally autonomous board.
Depending on the specific provisions of the state constitution, the
courts also appear to agree that the legislative appropriation power
only extends to state general funds derived from taxation and not to
income generated by institutional operations and thus already under
the control of the governing board.
The holdings in these cases leave a great deal yet to be decided
regarding the overlapping responsibilities of governing boards and
state legislatures, and some of them may give a misleading impression of the practical significance of constitutional autonomy, given
the very real dependence of public institutions of higher education
upon state appropriated funds for their continued quality and success. 156 Nevertheless, the cases are clearly supportive of an important tradition of independence in American higher education, and
they underscore the need for legislative understanding of the coexistent authority of a constitutionally established governing board
of higher education.
156.
See generally,
L.
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